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Finally there appeared in the last place another new Fund, which, 
following the beaten track, was also represented by an agent, who 
without discrimination granted Credit whereby in the end even the 
pettiest, yes craftsmen, were metamorphosed into planters (…)1 
Adriaan Gootenaar, administrator and colonial agent, 1778. 
 
We just experienced one of the greatest financial crashes in history, which 
started with subprime loans in the American housing market. Therefore, 
one might assume that this subprime crisis was a highly unique event, yet 
there are some interesting historical parallels to be drawn. In the twenty-first 
century, we find a system that stimulated risky lending to people who could 
hardly afford a mortgage, yet still received one, based on the premise that 
the risk would be offset by rising property prices. While this system was 
successful in increasing homeownership, it also led to the Great Recession 
after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in September 2008.2  
In the Dutch Republic, in the second half of the eighteenth century, a 
credit system was devised that looked remarkably similar. Instead of houses, 
the collateral consisted of plantations in the West Indies, and the borrowers 
were people who desired to become rich by producing sugar, cotton or 
                                                     
* I would like to thank Cátia Antunes and the Leidschrift editors for their useful 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This article draws from my master 
thesis ‘Subprime plantation mortgages in Suriname, Essequibo and Demerara, 
1750-1800. On manias, Ponzi processes and illegal trade in the Dutch negotiatie 
system’ (unpublished, Leiden 2012). 
1 Verslag over de toestand van de kolonie Suriname (door mr. C. Graafland en A. Gootenaar, 
voormalig secretaris van de kolonie). Met twee bijlagen, 1778, National Archive, The Hague, 
Archive Sociëteit van Suriname (hereafter NA, SvS), inv. nr. 509. Original quote: 
‘Eyndelyk vertoonde sig in de laaste plaatse nog een nieuw Fonds, het welk de 
gebaande wege volgende, en door een agendaris wierd gerepresentierd, dewelke 
sonder onderscheyd Crediet verleende waardoor eyndelyk de geringste ja 
ambachtsleiden in Planters gemetamosphoseerd wierden (…)’ (my own translation). 
2  R.M. Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble. The Road to Collapse (Santa 





coffee. Rising prices in the booming coffee sector seemed to guarantee the 
viability of the system and a staggering 80 million guilders is estimated to 
have been invested in these plantation mortgages, called negotiaties.3 These 
negotiatie loans were sold to investors, after being cut up in pieces of 
usually 1000 guilders. Plantation ownership increased dramatically, because 
credit was granted to almost anyone who desired a mortgage, as Adriaan 
Gootenaar asserted above. However, the system was too risky to be 
sustainable and the inevitable crash came in the 1770s, wiping out much of 
the invested capital. 
This article aims to increase our understanding of this subprime 
plantation mortgage crisis: it starts with a definition of ‘subprime loans’ and 
the necessary context, followed by an analysis of the rise and fall of the 
negotiatie system, through the model of a classic mania; secondly it 
examines the roles of different actors in the emergence and endurance of 
the system; the third and final part makes a brief comparison with the 
twenty-first century subprime crisis. 
 
 
Subprime lending and its context 
 
First we need to understand what a subprime mortgage actually is In my 
view, a subprime mortgage has two related characteristics. Firstly, the 
amount of credit is based on the value of the collateral, rather than on the 
borrower’s capacity to repay. This is because the system aims to attract 
people of below-average creditworthiness. Secondly, repayments require 
and depend on a rise in the value of the collateral. In practice this means 
that, given their low earnings, many borrowers are not able to make 
periodic repayments of the loan. Consequently, the only way to repay the 
loan is to sell the collateral at the end of the loan term for at least the 
original sum.  
Furthermore, stable prices are not enough. A subprime system will 
only continue to work smoothly as long as borrowers can avoid the 
problem of repayment by taking out more and more credit. This makes a 
subprime system circular and self-defeating: in order to convince creditors 
to lend money to unreliable borrowers, the interest rate would have to be 
set high. Yet this means that borrowers will have difficulty in meeting the 
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required payments, and they are likely to get further into debt. In turn, this 
makes them even less reliable as borrowers, so they would have to pay high 
interest rates for any of the extra credit they need. This cycle of debt 
accumulation makes a subprime system inherently unstable. It can only last 
as long as lenders are willing to grant ever more credit. In effect this means 
that the system last as long as collateral values keep rising. Speculation is an 
important element for the continuation the upward trend, and it follows 
that a subprime system can only thrive in an atmosphere of 
overconfidence.4 While a subprime system will collapse as soon as collateral 
prices go down, even the flattening of prices can undermine the necessary 
confidence. Subprime lending would therefore not take place without a 
potential for high profits, nor would it gain ground if all actors acted 
rationally and completely understood the risks from the outset. Some form 
of clouded judgement or irrational exuberance must be present on at least 
one part of the actors, which can result from information asymmetry or 
from the complexity of the financial products.5 
The above characterization is just a first attempt at defining the 
subprime mortgage concept, for at the moment a generally accepted 
definition is lacking, and the phenomenon is usually seen in relation to the 
recent American housing crisis.6 While the term ‘subprime’ is indeed recent, 
it could be useful to go beyond this self-referencing and take ‘subprime 
loans’ as a concept rather than an historically specific phenomenon. It then 
becomes clear that it can be found in other historical periods as well.  
 
The context in which the subprime plantation loans emerged after 1750 was 
the expansion of plantation economies in what is now Surinam and Guyana. 
These colonies offered a bright economic future: on slave-driven 
plantations, valuable tropical commodities like sugar, coffee, and later also 
cotton, were produced for the European market. This required enormous 
capital investments but cash was scarce in the colonies. Planters had to 
import almost everything and their African labour force was especially 
expensive. Therefore, the governor of Surinam asked the mayor of 
Amsterdam, Willem Deutz, to devise a credit system to stimulate colonial 
expansion. And in 1753 Deutz came up with the negotiatie system: a 
                                                     
4 M. Lewis, The Big Short Inside the Doomsday Machine (New York 2010). 
5 R.J. Shiller, Irrational exuberance (2nd edition; Princeton and Oxford 2005) 68-78. 
6 Hardaway, Housing Bubble, 142-143; R.J. Shiller, The Subprime Solution. How Today’s 





director of a negotiatie fund would act as intermediary between the 
investors in the Dutch Republic and (prospective) planters in the colonies. 
The fund would raise capital by selling bonds, which carried an attractive 
interest rate of five to six per cent. On the other side of the Atlantic an 
agent would look for creditworthy borrowers and appraisers determined the 
value of an estate or a new plot of land, based on the total value of the land, 
buildings and slaves. Subsequently, a mortgage could be arranged with the 
fund, and the planter typically was allowed to receive up to five-eighth, or 
sometimes three-quarters, of the appraised value in credit. During the first 
ten years the planter only had to pay interest, while during the next decade 
he also had to repay the principal. The new planter had to declare he would 
send all his produce to the fund director, who would sell it for a 
commission fee. Often the same condition applied for the planter’s 
imports.7  
On first glance this system benefited all players involved: the planters 
got the necessary credit, the fund director received several fees and the 
investors enjoyed a return on their capital that was almost twice as high as 
elsewhere in the Dutch Republic.8 However, the negotiatie system proved 
subprime, containing far more risks than initially expected. The system 
attracted many parvenu planters, as loans were based on the value of the 
estate, rather than its productivity or profitability. As long as the appraisals 
of the plantations continued to increase, the system appeared sound. Yet 
when confidence was undermined, it quickly collapsed. Most of the loans 
originated before 1776 and should have been repaid before the end of the 
century. However, at the end of the century, less than one-third of the 
original investment was returned to the creditors, while most of the rest was 







                                                     
7 Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 91-94. 
8  M. ‘t Hart, ‘Mutual advantages: State bankers as brokers between the city of 
Amsterdam and the Dutch Republic’ in: O. Gelderblom ed., The Political Economy of 
the Dutch Republic (Farnham 2009) 115-142: 116. 
9 Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 180, 184, 195. 




The plantation loans as a mania 
 
In the literature the failure of the plantation loans is often linked to the 
1772-1773 stock exchange crisis in Amsterdam. Especially Piet Emmer 
claimed that the Bourse crash itself was caused by planters who could not 
afford their loans anymore once their interest-only period was over. 10 
However, the causality seems to run the other way. The stock exchange 
crisis had an external cause, found in speculation in London by Dutch 
merchant houses, and only afterwards did it have an effect on the negotiatie 
system by making investors more wary of their investment portfolio. Alex 
van Stipriaan and Gert Oostindie have therefore argued against this 
emphasis on the stock exchange crisis, and focused more on the difficulties 
that were inherent in the plantation economy in general, and the mortgage 
system in particular. Indeed, this seems a more promising approach.11 To 
enhance our understanding we have to ask a different question. We should 
not just explore why the negotiatie system failed, but also ask how such a 
risky subprime structure could it have been so successful in the first place. 
 If we look more closely at the negotiatie system, we can see it follows 
Charles Kindleberger’s model of a bubble or mania.12 It started when a new 
opportunity for profit was created by the financial innovation of the 
negotiatie fund. Deutz himself had not been very successful himself - by the 
time of his death in 1757, he had granted 900,000 guilders in unsecured 
loans out of his own pockets - but a few years later the conditions seemed 
favourable again. Rising coffee prices and peace agreements with the 
maroons in Surinam improved the prospects, especially for the coffee sector, 
which received 85 per cent of Surinam’s plantation loans before 1769.13 
                                                     
10 P.C. Emmer, De Nederlandse slavenhandel 1500-1850 (Amsterdam 2000) 171. 
11  A. van Stipriaan, ‘Debunking Debts. Image and Reality of a Colonial Crisis: 
Suriname at the End of the 18th century’, Itinerario 19.1 (1995) 69-84; A. van 
Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast. Roofbouw en overleven in een Caraïbische plantagekolonie 1750-
1863 (Leiden 1993) 216; G. Oostindie, ‘The Economics of Surinam Slavery’, 
Economic and Social history in the Netherlands V (1993) 1-24; P.C. Emmer, ‘Capitalism 
Mistaken? The Economic Decline of Surinam and the Plantation Loans, 1773-1850: 
A Rehabilitation’, Itinerario 20.1 (1996) 11-18. 
12  C.P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes. A History of Financial Crisis (2nd 
edition; New York 1989) 17-23. 






 The result was a real boom in the extension of plantation mortgages. 
This phase, the heyday of the negotiatie structure, lasted until 1770. Until 
then the system had proven to be effective in enlarging the plantation sector 
in the various colonies. As many dozens of new plantations were laid out, 
the production of cotton and especially coffee increased dramatically. 14 
However, the system became overheated. The boom had turned into a 
bubble as inexperienced planters were given 100 per cent mortgages, based 
on valuations that were pushed upwards solely by speculation. At the time, 
this upward trend seemed warranted by rising prices of both inputs and 
output: slave prices rose and peaked in 1769, while coffee prices also 
increased dramatically from 72 cents per kilo in 1761 to 104 cents in 1769.15 
But this was really the top of the mania. At this point new entrants were 
balanced by retreats, as the shaky fundamentals of the system became 
increasingly apparent. External factors, such as a severe drought and 
renewed maroon attacks in Surinam, cast doubt on the allegedly bright 
future of the negotiatie system. Those who foresaw what was happening 
began to cash out. At least 59 plantations were sold before 1769, valued at 
more than 9.5 million guilders, over half of them in 1769 alone. Surinam’s 
governor, Jean Nepveu, provided a similar account: he asserted that in 1770 
at least 80 plantations were sold, for more than 12 million guilders.16 Indeed, 
credit conditions began to tighten and already in 1771 remarks are made 
about the shortage of credit.17 
 Now that the mania was over, financial distress began to show. The 
number of new mortgages decreased, and the prices of coffee and slaves 
came down again from their peaks in 1769-1770. The result was that 
                                                     
14  Van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast, 439; E.W. van der Oest, ‘The Forgotten 
Colonies of Essequibo and Demerara, 1700-1814’ in: J. Postma en V. Enthoven, 
Riches from Atlantic Commerce. Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585-1817 (Leiden 
and Boston 2003) 329. 
15 Van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast, 434-5; http://www.slavevoyages.org, accessed 
10 May 2013. The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database is a joint project that 
combines scholarly knowledge on the trans-Altantic slave trade, assembled by many 
different researchers. 
16  Van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast, 69. According to the calculator of the 
International Institute of Social History, the sum of 9,5 million guilders would 
today represent a value of 90 million euros; 
http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/calculate2.php, accessed 14 June 2013. 
17 J. Hudig Dzn., De West-indische zaken van Ferrand Whaley Hudig 1759-1797 
(Hilversum 1922) 63. 




planters were saddled with huge debts, from which they could hardly escape. 
Slaves, bought at peak prices, could not provide the necessary income in 
face of the declining coffee prices. And while lower slave prices might 
sound like a good development from a planter’s perspective, it also meant 
that the valuation of the planter’s estate would go down, as slaves formed a 
key part of a plantation’s value. Therefore, it became increasingly difficult 
for a planter to receive more credit, even if he genuinely wanted to invest in 
his business. All of this meant that the negotiatie system was very vulnerable, 
and the 1772-1773 financial crisis provided another major blow. The crisis 
ended the unbridled optimism and brought down the firm of Clifford & 
Chevalier, which held plantation loans as part of its portfolio. The final 
shock was probably the downfall of one of the biggest mortgage funds, that 
of Abraham ter Borch & Sons, which suspended payments in 1772 and was 
taken over in January 1774: it showed that even big funds could be brought 
down by bad loans.18 
 Attempts to fix the system were made, but to no avail.19 Very little 
new capital was extended and the result was a credit crunch. This meant 
that even financially sound planters encountered difficulty in obtaining 
credit, which was vital to conduct normal business. The investors now faced 
a tough choice: trying to recollect some of their money by auctioning off 
plantations, or to restructure and try to run an estate themselves. The 
former option was unattractive because prices had fallen to a third of the 
appraised value now that prices were not sustained by speculation anymore. 
Furthermore, the supply of bankrupt estates was high, and demand was low 
- if a buyer could be found at all - which depressed prices even further. The 
second option was almost as bad, as it involved getting into an unfamiliar 
business and involved additional costs. An administrator had to be 
appointed and new investments would have to be made. A common 
solution was therefore to set up a shareholder society, that bought the 
plantation in name of the collective investors. Instead of bonds the society 
issued shares. This meant that payouts where only made if actual profits 
were attained, rather than paying a fixed amount every year. In 1796 two-
thirds of the plantations in Surinam was in the hands of administrators, 
testifying to the failure of the negotiatie system.20 
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19 Ibidem, 164-68; Verslag, NA, SvS, inv. nr. 509. 





The main actors and their motivations 
 
Now that the weaknesses of the system have been discussed, we should ask 
how it was possible for it to have emerged in the first place and why it 
lasted for decades, with some loans remaining in existence well into the 19th 
century. The three major actors – fund directors, investors and planters – all 
seem to have had a distorted view of the risks involved and of who would 
take final responsibility. And the stakes were high: we have to acknowledge 
that in a time when a normal soldier in the colonies earned 8 guilders a 
month, it was a serious risk to lend a planter the huge sum of 80,000 
guilders.21  
How did the fund managers get all this money in the first place? An 
extensive social network proved crucial. Many fund managers had occupied 
important positions, like mayor, aldermen, or director of the West India 
Company. Some were even slave traders. In principal, the directors sold 
bonds to anyone who was interested. Later funds, like Voordelig en voorsigtig, 
(Profitable and Prudent) founded in 1776, even advertised their fund as a 
sound way to save for one’s pension. The group of investors was highly 
diverse, from a group of small investors including ‘orphans, widows and 
unmarried women’ next to family members of the director, who were not 
seldom among the biggest investors in the fund.22 This latter part points to a 
crucial element: it signifies that a bond was not just a contractual agreement, 
but also included the implicit moral obligation to return the invested sums. 
It would be hard for a fund director to tell his own family members he had 
squandered their capital.  
In theory, the fund manager was like a spider in the web, who took 
no financial risks himself. 23  He merely lent other people’s money to 
overseas planters, who carried the responsibility to repay. This would be a 
situation of tremendous moral hazard. It would stimulate the fund to take 
                                                     
21Van de Voort, Westindische plantages, 269-343; G. Oostindie, Roosenburg en Mon Bijou. 
Twee Surinaamse plantages, 1720-1870 (Leiden 1989) 283-305. Dutch Association Papers, 
The National Archives, Kew (TNA), Colonial Office (CO), inv. nr. CO 116/48, fol. 
103; Lists of Dutch proprietors of plantations in Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, TNA, inv. 
nr. CO 111/28. 
22 W.H. Berghuis, Ontstaan en ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse beleggingsfondsen tot 1914 
(Rotterdam 1967) 49-72; Oostindie, Twee Surinaamse plantages 356-57; ACA, Not., 
inv. nr. 5075, fol. 12725/81. 
23 Van Stipriaan, ‘Debunking debts’, 75. 




excessive risks, and extended as many mortgages as possible, based on the 
idea they could not lose. In practice, the situation was rather more complex. 
Indeed, from Deutz onwards, virtually all of the most important fund 
managers paid interest to bondholders out of their own pockets, to 
compensate for the meager payments the planters made.24 The key reason 
was the desire to satisfy the bondholders: since a prominent figure like a 
fund director would want to uphold his reputation, he could not pass on the 
losses without hesitation. His name functioned as a guarantee that the 
financial products he sold were sound, so he could not easily confess he had 
sold worthless paper. Therefore, it could seem wise to invest some private 
capital, hoping that prices would rise or next year’s harvest would be better. 
Presenting bondholders with the real state of affairs would be highly 
problematic. It was unclear who should shoulder the losses, as the contracts 
were silent on this. Openness would therefore most likely lead to outrage 
among investors and severely discredit the director and his fund, so secrecy 
and hope for future improvements must have seemed the better way to go 
forward.  
 Yet initially negotiatie directors were confident, and some even 
bought their own bonds. The overconfidence present in the system was 
borne out by the more speculative directors, who would extend credit on 
personal title before any of the necessary paperwork was in order. Typically, 
two or three commissioners supervised the fund director on behalf of the 
investors, to make sure the money was well spent. A prospective borrower 
had to prove that he – and often his wife too – and his plantation were free 
from any debts. Additionally, he needed to present a proper valuation of the 
estate. A notary then formalized the mortgage agreement before the 
plantation was taken onto the fund’s balance sheet. However, directors like 
Fredrik Berewout, and Cornelis Lever & Johannes de Bruine were quick to 
skip these steps. They advanced sums of 400,000 guilders without proper 
documentation and consequently the commissioners would not accept these 
mortgages into the fund. The result was that the directors held the 
mortgages in their own name, fully exposing them to all the risks involved.25  
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 So while the fund director aimed to make a profit, the earnings of 
commission fees could quickly turn into a loss if he decided to take 
responsibility of a few bad loans. That is not to say that fund directors did 
not find additional ways of making a profit, for example by charging 
artificially high prices for the planters’ imports. Yet while several fund 
managers benefited, we must acknowledge that the business was far more 
difficult, complex and risky than it seemed at first sight. 
 It would have been easier for fund directors to make a profit if they 
had kept an interest rate differential between what planters paid and 
bondholders received. However, this measure was seldom taken, probably 
because of the competition between the various funds. This meant that in 
most funds any shortfalls in payments either had to be covered by the fund 
manager or had to result in lower payouts to the bondholders. But even a 
buffer was not enough to compensate for the growing debts of unreliable 
planters, as the case of Ferrand Whaley Hudig’s fund demonstrated: the 
planters had to pay six per cent interest, while the investors received five. 
The rest was reserved for managing costs and for weathering difficult times, 
to be returned to investors eventually. 26  However, even such a buffer 
proved inadequate, as Hudig felt the need to advance large sums of his own 
capital, such as the 18,000 guilders for the plantation La Confiance.27  
If bondholders would have been directly confronted with the losses 
of the planters, they would not have put tens of millions of guilders on the 
line. Yet because transparency was lacking and they kept being paid, 
investor confidence remained high until the early 1770s. Yet when the 
problems were exposed in the 1770s, it became clear that the system was a 
house of cards. While the early entrants had enjoyed high profits, those who 
joined the negotiatie bubble late could only lose. Interest rates were lowered, 
from six to three to 1.5 per cent, and in many years nothing was paid. At the 
same time, the repayment of the principal was postponed far beyond the 
original terms, sometimes simply into the indefinite future.28  
  Turning to the motivations of the actors in the colonies themselves, 
we can see how the negotiatie system encouraged speculation, both fuelling 
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the boom and increasing the likelihood of its destruction. The amount of 
credit was based on the valuation of the plantation’s inventory, and this 
brought about two weaknesses in the negotiate structure. First, it offered 
extensive opportunities for fraud: the appraiser (called priseur) could be a 
friend providing a favourable interpretation of the estate. But one could also 
simply deceive the priseur, for example by borrowing slaves from a 
neighbour on the day of the valuation, to make one’s own slave force seem 
bigger.29 The second shortcoming was the vulnerability to speculation. Even 
if a planter had no intention to inflate his estates’ value, the general 
speculative trend in the colony would have the same effect. In Demerara an 
acre was worth two to three guilders in 1759, while in 1769 this had 
skyrocketed to more than 30 guilders. In Surinam the increase was less 
dramatic, yet land prices also doubled in the 1770s, to come down again 
quickly after the boom. 30  Such numbers seemed to make planters rich 
overnight. And since money was so easily available, the temptation to raise 
one’s credit limit may have been too great for many a planter.  
 Of course not all of this money was spent wisely, and numerous 
accusations exist of high-living planters who spent most of their time with 
their female slaves, gambling, and drinking.31 Moreover, it often occurred 
that the planter withdrew more than he was allowed to, after which the fund 
director had to step in again with his own capital. This was partly the result 
of a timing problem with the bills of exchange. The director kept the 
current account for the planter, and the latter would draw a bill in case he 
needed payment for a good or service. But even if the products to 
compensate the director were underway, one could never be sure what the 
revenue would be. Yet for the director it was not easy to refuse payment. 
The alternative, sending the bill back in protest, would mean that the 
planter had to pay a fine of 25 per cent, which would further increase the 
financial problems for the planter and harm the relationship between the 
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two actors. In practice, the least problematic way was often to honour the 
bill.32 
 This flexible interpretation of the conditions ensured the smooth 
functioning of the negotiatie structure, but also offered planters the 
opportunity to abuse the system. This applied all the more to the initial 
plantation purchase. Officially, the risks for the mortgage fund were kept in 
check because the amount of credit would not exceed five-eighth or three-
quarters of the plantation’s worth. In case the plantation would lose value, 
the investors would still be protected, while irresponsible planters would be 
deterred by the significant down payments required. Yet in practice up to 
100 per cent loans were no exception. Since payment was usually done in 
several installments, and arranged by the fund director, this process was 
open to abuse. The contemporary journal De Koopman described how: if one 
could convince the director to pay the first two installments, the planter had 
additional time to acquire the money, for example by selling the first harvest 
of plantation products. Yet if the planter had been unable to procure the 
capital, it was mainly the director’s problem, who would be caught in the 
middle: either he would have to pay the final installments as well, or would 
have to try to sell the newly acquired plantation at his own risk. 33 
Constructions like this were possible because lending standards were 
gradually lowered in the competition between the various mortgage funds. 
Second mortgages and 100 per cent mortgages were no exception. While 
this allowed the negotiatie system to expand further, it made its foundations 
ever more unstable.34  
 This competition between funds further inflated the bubble by 
stimulating ‘fund hopping’: mortgages could be transferred from one fund 
to another when a planter had depleted his director’s willingness to grant 
him ever more credit. An example is provided by Joseph D’Strada and his 
Surinam coffee plantation ‘Mon Souci’. In February 1769 D’Strada had 
received 142,239 guilders in credit from the fund of Hermaal & Van den 
Bosch. In the next two years the plantation’s value rose by 90,000 guilders 
and D’Strada subsequently wished to withdraw more credit. Yet his fund 
managers refused, so all parties agreed that a new fund had to be found to 
transfer the mortgage to. This succeeded: in August 1772 Hageman & 
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Twisk issued 200,000 guilders in bonds to take over D’Strada’s debt. Most 
of this new loan, nearly 178,000 guilders, was used to reimburse the former 
fund directors. For the D’Strada this brought an extra advantage, because 
his ten year interest-only period started anew, thereby postponing the 
problem of repaying the principal.35 So Hermaal and Van den Bosch had 
used 35,000 guilders of their own money to pay for all of D’Strada’s 
uncovered expenses. The fact that Hermaal & Van den Bosch wanted to get 
rid of D’Strada should have been a warming sign, yet a new and higher 
valuation inspired enough confidence in the new fund of Hageman & Twisk 
to accept the mortgage. Without this fund hopping an unreliable planter 
would eventually run into trouble, while with a new mortgage he received a 





Even though labeling the eighteenth century mortgage crisis as ‘subprime’ 
runs the risk of being anachronistic, new insights can be found when the 
concept is used open-mindedly to compare different crises. Finding 
communalities might help to better understand the frequent occurrence of 
economic crises and points away from the idea that every crisis is unique.  
The plantation mortgages fit the definition of a subprime system. 
Credit was granted to planters based solely on the value of the collateral, 
ignoring the profitability of the plantation and thus the potential to repay 
the loan. Furthermore, the system could only exist as long as new capital 
was injected into the system, for which the plantation’s value needed to 
keep rising. As long as investors and fund directors maintained a positive 
view of the future of the negotiatie system, rising values and new credit 
might seemed warranted. Yet speculation, flexible application of the 
conditions or even outright fraud undermined the system. External shocks 
– a severe draught, renewed maroon attacks and declining coffee prices – 
pushed the system past the tipping point from mania to financial distress, 
while the subsequent stock exchange crisis of 1772-1773 and bankruptcy of 
Ter Borch’s fund sealed the fate of the negotiatie system. 
The plantation mortgages had many features in common with the 
subprime mortgages on American houses. The lowering of lending 
standards, use of consumption credit, asymmetric information and 
                                                     





obfuscation of risk were comparable, although differences exist in which 
actors shouldered the ultimate responsibility for the losses.  
In the United States borrowers were specifically targeted according to 
their below-average credit scores, and in the Dutch negotiatie system no 
thorough credibility check was present other than an agent’s opinion. In the 
twenty-first century a borrower could use the overvalue on his house for 
consumption, resulting in an increase in household debt from 65 per cent in 
1981 to 135 per cent of disposable income in 2008. While such exact 
numbers are unavailable for the eighteenth century, planters gradually 
amassed more debt and the stark accusations of conspicuous consumption 
suggest not all of it was put to productive use.36 The problem of asymmetric 
information was also present in both subprime systems. In the United 
States this was caused both by the immense complexity of the financial 
products that were traded, and by the originate-and-distribute model of 
selling the mortgage packages onwards to people who had less intricate 
knowledge of its contents. The source of information asymmetry was 
different in the Dutch case. The negotiaties were not necessarily designed to 
be actively traded, but rather to be held for the full 20 years. This suggests 
that investors could have had more knowledge of what they invested in, yet 
in practice this was not the case. Fund directors were not very forthcoming 
with information, and especially in the early negotiaties it was rather unclear 
where the money went to. These loans were called ‘generale negotiaties’, 
which had the general aim of providing mortgage credit to planters in a 
specific region in the West Indies, and they provided no information about 
the receivers or the collateral. Such packages could contain loans to 20 or 
more plantations and before 1772 at least 40 of these bundles were issued, 
their names as unspecific as L.a. A, B or C. Investors thus had little 
knowledge of what they invested in, and lent their money purely on good 
faith and the word of the fund director. We might even say that the name of 
the director had the same function here as the triple A-rating of a credit 
rating agency in the twenty-first century case: the seal of approval was more 
important than the actual content of the loan. Regardless of this, after 1772 
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this type of negotiaties disappeared, to be followed up by loans to individual 
plantations.37  
The final common element was the obfuscation of risk. In the 
American subprime structure financial innovation had many risks, in theory, 
better manageable. By combining different qualities of loans, repackaging 
them and selling them onwards, the risk was divided and spread and thereby 
reduced to negligible proportions. This made it unclear who would shoulder 
the responsibility for potential large-scale defaults, which was also the case 
in the Dutch negotatie structure. It could be either the planter, who could 
be dismissed with his estate put up for sale, or the investor, who might not 
get his principal back. Since auctions did not bring in enough money to 
reimburse all the creditors, often both parties lost. The situation became 
even more complex if the fund director, in theory sheltered from risk, 
decided to put his own capital on the line by advancing the interest to 
investors, on behalf of planters in arrears.38 
The fact that many fund directors took responsibility to fill these 
gaps accounts for the greatest difference between the two subprime systems. 
In receiving a bail-out, the American banks were largely sheltered from the 
losses, while the originators of the negotiatie loans had a more personal 
agreement with their investors. Therefore, the Dutch fund managers, were 
also hit personally once their subprime system met its inevitable demise.  
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